When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
Introduction
One of the most prominent results in the literature on incomplete contracts and property rights as pioneered by Hart and Moore (see Hart and Moore, 1990 , Moore, 1992 , and Hart, 1995 says that not more than one agent should have veto power over an asset. This conclusion crucially depends on Hart and Moore's assumption that property rights only matter as far as they influence the parties' incentives to make investments in human capital, which may be called "self-investments" (following Che and Hausch, 1997) .
1 However, in the context of research joint ventures, the surplus which may be generated by the parties usually also depends on how much know-how they disclose to each other. 2 Since such disclosure is directly beneficial to the other party, it is a kind of "cooperative investment" in the sense of Che and Hausch (1997) .
We argue that the necessity to provide incentives for investment in human capital as well as for know-how disclosure may lead to conclusions which are in sharp contrast to Hart and Moore's findings. In particular, it may well be 1 We follow Hart and Moore and do not consider investments in physical capital (cf. Hart and Moore, 1990 , p. 1132 , and Hart, 1995 . Note that there are two other papers which show that it may be beneficial to give veto-power to more than one agent: Halonen (1995) , who considers a repeated game, and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who change Hart and Moore's assumption about the renegotiation process.
2 The importance of know-how disclosure in research joint ventures has been emphasized by Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington (1992) , Gandal and Scotchmer (1993) , and d 'Aspremont, Bhattacharya and Gérard-Varet (1995) . However, their focus is on optimal complete contracts.
optimal to give both parties veto-power. and β ∈ £ β, β ¤ . Know-how disclosure by party A is assumed to increase the effectiveness of B 0 s investment and vice versa. Surplus can only be generated with the help of an asset. At date t = 0, the parties write a contract on the allocation of ownership rights over the asset.
At date t = 2, the parties can decide whether to continue their joint venture. We assume that continuation is always efficient. Hence, according to the Coase-theorem, bargaining at t = 2 will always lead to an affirmative decision. However, how the surplus is shared depends on the allocation of ownership rights which determine the threatpoint in the bargaining over the use of the asset. The threatpoints reflect the payoffs each party can realize on its own. We consider four different ownership structures, o ∈ {A, B, JV, JN }.
If party A is the owner of the asset (o = A) , it earns w A (a, β) if bargaining breaks down, and it can prevent the other party from using the asset, hence 
The know-how of a party is assumed to be a less-than-perfect substitute for the presence of this party in the joint venture. If no know-how has been disclosed, the continued presence of B in the joint venture increases A 0 s payoff from w A (a, β) to v A (a, β) > w A (a, β). Know-how disclosure increases both of these payoffs. The more know-how has been disclosed by party B, the less important is its further presence in the joint venture. But some part of B 0 s abilities is not transferable and therefore cannot be communicated via
and similarly for party B. Thus, it seems natural to assume w Provided that the surplus from bargaining at date t = 2 is split according to the Nash-bargaining solution with equal bargaining powers, it is easily 5 Throughout, all functions are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable. Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts.
checked that final payoffs are given by: 
For comparison we first consider the standard case without know-how disclosure.
Proposition 1 Assume that α = α and β = β. The investment levels under the four different ownership structures can be ordered as follows:
The proposition immediately follows from the preceding discussion. Note that there is always underinvestment with respect to the first-best, so that an ownership structure that induces both parties to invest more also yields a larger total surplus. Hence, we have reproduced Hart and Moore's result that joint ownership with veto power is always weakly dominated by separate ownership. Moreover, we find that joint ownership with no veto power is the optimal ownership structure in our model. We can now state our main result.
Proposition 2 Assume that α < α and β < β, (such that know-how can actually be disclosed), and that the following two inequalities hold:
Then it follows:
This is exactly the opposite to the standard result. Here bilateral veto power induces parties to disclose their know-how and also to invest more into human capital than ownership structures with unilateral or without veto power. Although possible threat from product market competition is left out of the analysis, parties still do not disclose their know-how: Given they have no veto power, know-how disclosure improves the other party's bargaining position at date t = 2. Therefore joint ownership with veto power can be optimal even if investment is in human capital only. If the asset to be owned is an innovation or a patent which can be used by both parties at the same time, joint ownership with no veto power would be optimal in the standard model, while it may be the worst scenario with know-how disclosure.
6 Note that the conditions may well be satisfied if the marginal return of investment is increasing with know-how disclosure, i.e., v A aβ > 0 and v B bα > 0, which seems to be plausible. Even if only one of the two inequalities holds, o = JV is better than at least one of the separate ownership structures. Moreover, bilateral veto-power can be optimal even if the inequalities do not hold, since full know-how disclosure may overcompensate lower investment levels.
